Multiple vulnerabilities have been discovered in the Firmware of CHARX SEC charge controllers.
Update: credis have been updated
Multiple vulnerabilities have been discovered in the Firmware of CHARX SEC charge controllers. These vulnerabilities were discovered as part of a PWN2OWN competition initiated by Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative (ZDI).
Phoenix Contact classic line industrial controllers are developed and designed for the use in closed industrial networks. The controllers don’t feature a function to check integrity and authenticity of the application (e.g.: logic files, executable logic, configurations).
Logic files generated by Automation Worx could be manipulated on the engineering station and loaded into the PLC without tamper detection. In addition, the tampering can be done by specially designed attacks in such a way that it remains hidden, and the logic program modifies its own code, making it difficult to determine the impact of a malicious program.
PLCnext Control provides authentication and integrity check for the application.
An authenticated, skilled attacker might be able to manipulate the application (e.g.: logic files, executable logic, configurations) in a special crafted way that the integrity check will not be able to recognize these tampering attempts which are then difficult to remove.
PLCnext Engineer warns users if the PLC logic is different from the current loaded project when Online mode is activated. In addition, during loading an application on the PLC, a Project Integrity Warning logging entry is generated.
A skilled attacker might be able to manipulate the application in a special crafted way that the integrity check will not be able to recognize tampering attempts.
Increased Security attacks against OT infrastructure and research of Dragos makes it necessary to publish this advisory giving users hints according to basic security measures to support automation systems using existing devices based on ProConOS/ProConOS eCLR.
ProConOS/ProConOS eCLR controller runtime system has been offered as a Software Development Kit (SDK) to automation suppliers that build their own automation devices. ProConOS/ProConOS eCLR is embedded into automation suppliers’ hardware, real-time operating systems (RTOS), firmware, and I/O systems.
The application (e.g.: logic files, executable logic, configurations) had been designed without integrity and authenticity check which was state of the art when developing the products.
A CRC Check warning the user if the application of the Engineering tool and the PLC differs can be manipulated.
Users need to check with their device vendors if they are affected by this attack vulnerability or if the specific device integration mitigates this attack vector.
Phoenix Contact classic line industrial controllers are developed and designed for the use in closed industrial networks. The controllers don’t feature a function to check integrity and authenticity of the application (e.g.: logic files, executable logic, configurations).
A CRC Check warning the user if the application of the Engineering tool and the PLC differs can be manipulated.
Increased Security attacks against OT infrastructure and research of Dragos makes it necessary to publish this advisory giving users hints according to basic security measures to support automation systems using existing devices based on ProConOS/ProConOS eCLR.
ProConOS/ProConOS eCLR controller runtime system has been offered as a Software Development Kit (SDK) to automation suppliers that build their own automation devices. ProConOS/ProConOS eCLR is embedded into automation suppliers’ hardware, real-time operating systems (RTOS), firmware, and I/O systems.
The application (e.g.: logic files, executable logic, configurations) had been designed without integrity and authenticity check which was state of the art when developing the products.
Logic files generated by MULTIPROG Engineering tool could be manipulated on the engineering station and loaded into the PLC without tamper detection. In addition, tampering can be done by specially designed attacks in such a way that it remains hidden, and the logic program modifies its own code, making it difficult to determine the impact of a malicious program.
Users need to check with their device vendors if they are affected by this attack vulnerability or if the specific device integration mitigates this attack vector.
PLCnext Control provides authentication and integrity check for the application.
An authenticated, skilled attacker might be able to manipulate the application (e.g.: logic files, executable logic, configurations) in a special crafted way that the integrity check will not be able to recognize these tampering attempts which are then difficult to remove.
To successfully exploit this vulnerability, the attacker must have access to the application either with PLCnext Engineer on the Engineering station, the stored application, the application during download or the application storage on the PLC.