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Heidenhain: TNC7 affected by a Linux Kernel Cryptographic In-Place Memory Vulnerability

VDE-2026-073
Last update
09/01/2026 12:00
Published at
09/01/2026 12:00
Vendor(s)
DR. JOHANNES HEIDENHAIN GmbH
External ID
VDE-2026-073
CSAF Document

Summary

Heidenhain: TNC7 affected by a Linux Kernel Cryptographic In-Place Memory Vulnerability

Impact

These vulnerabilities allow a local, low-privileged attacker to escalate privileges to root or cause system instability within the affected product components. CVE-2026-31431 and CVE-2026-43500 result from flawed in-place memory handling during cryptographic operations, while CVE-2026-43285 can lead to a kernel deadlock. Confidentiality, integrity, and availability are fully compromised.

Affected Product(s)

Model no. Product name Affected versions
817620 vers:generic/>=18.0|<18.5, vers:generic/>=20.0|<20.4, vers:generic/>=19.0|<19.3
817621 vers:generic/>=19.0|<19.3, vers:generic/>=18.0|<18.5, vers:generic/>=20.0|<20.4
817625 vers:generic/>=19.0|<19.3, vers:generic/>=18.0|<18.5, vers:generic/>=20.0|<20.4

Vulnerabilities

Expand / Collapse all

Published
08/25/2026 10:58
Weakness
Incorrect Resource Transfer Between Spheres (CWE-669)
Summary

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: algif_aead - Revert to operating out-of-place This mostly reverts commit 72548b093ee3 except for the copying of the associated data. There is no benefit in operating in-place in algif_aead since the source and destination come from different mappings. Get rid of all the complexity added for in-place operation and just copy the AD directly.

References

Published
11/12/2026 10:18
Weakness
Out-of-bounds Write (CWE-787)
Summary

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rxrpc: Also unshare DATA/RESPONSE packets when paged frags are present The DATA-packet handler in rxrpc_input_call_event() and the RESPONSE handler in rxrpc_verify_response() copy the skb to a linear one before calling into the security ops only when skb_cloned() is true. An skb that is not cloned but still carries externally-owned paged fragments (e.g. SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG set by splice() into a UDP socket via __ip_append_data, or a chained skb_has_frag_list()) falls through to the in-place decryption path, which binds the frag pages directly into the AEAD/skcipher SGL via skb_to_sgvec(). Extend the gate to also unshare when skb_has_frag_list() or skb_has_shared_frag() is true. This catches the splice-loopback vector and other externally-shared frag sources while preserving the zero-copy fast path for skbs whose frags are kernel-private (e.g. NIC page_pool RX, GRO). The OOM/trace handling already in place is reused.

References

Published
11/12/2026 10:18
Summary

National Institute of Standards and Technology
NVD MENU
Information Technology Laboratory
National Vulnerability Database
National Vulnerability Database
vulnerabilities
CVE-2026-43285 Detail
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/slab: do not access current->mems_allowed_seq if !allow_spin Lockdep complains when get_from_any_partial() is called in an NMI context, because current->mems_allowed_seq is seqcount_spinlock_t and not NMI-safe: ================================ WARNING: inconsistent lock state 6.19.0-rc5-kfree-rcu+ #315 Tainted: G N -------------------------------- inconsistent {INITIAL USE} -> {IN-NMI} usage. kunit_try_catch/9989 [HC1[1]:SC0[0]:HE0:SE1] takes: ffff889085799820 (&_s->seqcount#3){.-.-}-{0:0}, at: slab_alloc+0x58f/0xc00 {INITIAL USE} state was registered at: lock_acquire+0x185/0x320 kernel_init_freeable+0x391/0x1150 kernel_init+0x1f/0x220 ret_from_fork+0x736/0x8f0 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 irq event stamp: 56 hardirqs last enabled at (55): [] _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x27/0x70 hardirqs last disabled at (56): [] __schedule+0x2a8a/0x6630 softirqs last enabled at (0): [] copy_process+0x1dc1/0x6a10 softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&_s->seqcount#3); lock(&_s->seqcount#3); *** DEADLOCK *** According to Documentation/locking/seqlock.rst, seqcount_t is not NMI-safe and seqcount_latch_t should be used when read path can interrupt the write-side critical section. In this case, do not access current->mems_allowed_seq and avoid retry.

References

Remediation

Please update all TNC7 products with the respective versions to their next secure updates:
* 18.0<18.5 to 18.5
* 19.0<19.3 to 19.3
* 20.0<20.4 to 20.4

Acknowledgments

DR. JOHANNES HEIDENHAIN GmbH thanks the following parties for their efforts:

Revision History

Version Date Summary
1.0.0 09/01/2026 12:00 Initial version.