| Article No° | Product Name | Affected Version(s) |
|---|---|---|
| 750-81xx/xxx-xxx (PFC100) | >= FW12 | |
| 750-82xx/xxx-xxx (PFC200) | >= FW12 | |
| 762-4xxx | >= FW12 | |
| 762-5xxx | >= FW12 | |
| 762-6xxx | >= FW12 |
The firmware update package (WUP) is not signed entirely. The used password offers no additional security, it is just meant to protect from unintentional modifications of the WUP file. Thus only the integrity of the signed firmware part (rauc file) is protected against intended manipulation. An attacker could manipulate the WUP file in a way that additional files with potentially malicious content are added to the WUP file.
In case an authorized user that issues a firmware update could be tricked into installing this manipulated WUP file onto the device, the potentially malicious files would also be copied and installed on to the device and executed with elevated privileges.
An exploitable firmware downgrade vulnerability exists in the firmware update package functionality of the WAGO e!COCKPIT automation software v1.6.1.5. A specially crafted firmware update file can allow an attacker to install an older firmware version while the user thinks a newer firmware version is being installed. An attacker can create a custom firmware update package with invalid metadata in order to trigger this vulnerability.
An exploitable improper input validation vulnerability exists in the firmware update functionality of WAGO e!COCKPIT automation software v1.6.0.7. A specially crafted firmware update file can allow an attacker to write arbitrary files to arbitrary locations on WAGO controllers as a part of executing a firmware update, potentially resulting in code execution. An attacker can create a malicious firmware update package file using any zip utility. The user must initiate a firmware update through e!COCKPIT and choose the malicious wup file using the file browser to trigger the vulnerability.
The vulnerabilities allow an attacker who is able to exploit the described vulnerabilities and to trick an authorized user into installing the manipulated WUP file on the controller, to manipulate, to add or to remove any files they choose to from the corresponding device. Potentially malicious files may be executed.
Mitigation
Execute FW-Update only as user „admin“.
Solution
Validate the integrity of the WUP update package by verifying the hash of the file before starting FW update.
Checksums
These vulnerabilities were reported by Kelly Leuschner of Cisco Talos to WAGO.
Coordination done by CERT@VDE.