The TRUMPF products that are listed above contain a vulnerable version of Notepad++. This version is
being installed for support purposes only, so there is no danger of triggering this vulnerability in
Notepad++ during normal operations. Nevertheless, TRUMPF recommends mitigation of this
vulnerability.
When editing a specially crafted file containing UTF-8 characters in Notepad++ (Versions up to 8.5.6) and converting that file to UTF-16, a buffer overflow vulnerability can be exploited that allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code to take over the whole system.
Under certain circumstances, opening a specially crafted 7-zip package can exploit an integer
underflow vulnerability in 7-zip versions up to and including 22.x
This vulnerability allows for a remote code execution, resulting in unauthorized (remote) access to,
change of data or disruption of the whole service.
A heap-based buffer overflow caused by libcurl and wrong whitespace character interpretation in Javascript, both used in CodeMeter Runtime affecting multiple products by WAGO. WIBU-SYSTEMS Codemeter is installed by default during e!COCKPIT and WAGO-I/O-Pro (CODESYS 2.3) installations.
With TwinCAT/BSD based products the HTTPS request to the Authelia login page accepts user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site.
Increased Security attacks against OT infrastructure and research of Dragos makes it necessary to publish this advisory giving users hints according to basic security measures to support automation systems using existing devices based on ProConOS/ProConOS eCLR.
ProConOS/ProConOS eCLR controller runtime system has been offered as a Software Development Kit (SDK) to automation suppliers that build their own automation devices. ProConOS/ProConOS eCLR is embedded into automation suppliers’ hardware, real-time operating systems (RTOS), firmware, and I/O systems.
The application (e.g.: logic files, executable logic, configurations) had been designed without integrity and authenticity check which was state of the art when developing the products.
Logic files generated by MULTIPROG Engineering tool could be manipulated on the engineering station and loaded into the PLC without tamper detection. In addition, tampering can be done by specially designed attacks in such a way that it remains hidden, and the logic program modifies its own code, making it difficult to determine the impact of a malicious program.
Users need to check with their device vendors if they are affected by this attack vulnerability or if the specific device integration mitigates this attack vector.
Increased Security attacks against OT infrastructure and research of Dragos makes it necessary to publish this advisory giving users hints according to basic security measures to support automation systems using existing devices based on ProConOS/ProConOS eCLR.
ProConOS/ProConOS eCLR controller runtime system has been offered as a Software Development Kit (SDK) to automation suppliers that build their own automation devices. ProConOS/ProConOS eCLR is embedded into automation suppliers’ hardware, real-time operating systems (RTOS), firmware, and I/O systems.
The application (e.g.: logic files, executable logic, configurations) had been designed without integrity and authenticity check which was state of the art when developing the products.
A CRC Check warning the user if the application of the Engineering tool and the PLC differs can be manipulated.
Users need to check with their device vendors if they are affected by this attack vulnerability or if the specific device integration mitigates this attack vector.
Phoenix Contact classic line industrial controllers are developed and designed for the use in closed industrial networks. The controllers don’t feature a function to check integrity and authenticity of the application (e.g.: logic files, executable logic, configurations).
Logic files generated by Automation Worx could be manipulated on the engineering station and loaded into the PLC without tamper detection. In addition, the tampering can be done by specially designed attacks in such a way that it remains hidden, and the logic program modifies its own code, making it difficult to determine the impact of a malicious program.
PLCnext Control provides authentication and integrity check for the application.
An authenticated, skilled attacker might be able to manipulate the application (e.g.: logic files, executable logic, configurations) in a special crafted way that the integrity check will not be able to recognize these tampering attempts which are then difficult to remove.
To successfully exploit this vulnerability, the attacker must have access to the application either with PLCnext Engineer on the Engineering station, the stored application, the application during download or the application storage on the PLC.