The firmware update package (WUP) is not signed entirely. The used password offers no additional security, it is just meant to protect from unintentional modifications of the WUP file. Thus only the integrity of the signed firmware part (rauc file) is protected against intended manipulation. An attacker could manipulate the WUP file in a way that additional files with potentially malicious content are added to the WUP file.
In case an authorized user that issues a firmware update could be tricked into installing this manipulated WUP file onto the device, the potentially malicious files would also be copied and installed on to the device and executed with elevated privileges.

The Cloud Connectivity of the WAGO PLCs is used to connect the device with the cloud services from different providers. It also supports maintenance functionality with the firmware update function from the WAGO cloud.
An attacker needs an authorized login with administrative privileges on the device in order to exploit the mentioned vulnerabilities.

The Web-Based Management (WBM) of WAGOs programmable logic controller (PLC) is typically used for commissioning and update. The controller is an embedded device which has limited resources. The vulnerability described here takes advantage of this fact.
With special crafted requests it is possible to have a denial of service of the WBM.

With special crafted requests it is possible to get sensitive information, in this case the password hashes, by measuring response delay. With a substantial amount of time this data can be used to calculate the passwords of the Web-Based Management users. In case of CVE 2019-5134 , the password salt can also be extracted.

The communication between e!Cockpit and the programmable logic controller is not encrypted. The broken cryptographic algorithm allows an attacker to decode the password for the e!Cockpit communication and with this to manipulate the application.

The password used by e!Cockpit for authentication against the PLC is encrypted with a hard- coded key. An attacker is able to decrypt the password by listening to the network traffic.

Multiple Vulnerabilities exist in components used by the aforementioned products. See CVE-Details for more information.

CVS-2019-12255

Wind River VxWorks has a Buffer Overflow in the TCP component (issue 1 of 4). This is an IPNET security vulnerability: TCP Urgent Pointer = 0 that leads to an integer underflow.

The vulnerability affects a little-known feature of the TCP/IP protocol, sending out-of-band data, also known as urgent data. Although the feature is rarely used in the real world, its implementation, consisting of an “Urgent Flag” and an “Urgent Pointer”, is present in the header of every TCP packet. Exploiting these vulnerabilities does therefore not depend on any specific configuration. If a VxWorks device communicates using the TCP protocol, it is vulnerable. It also does not matter which side initiates a TCP connection. An attacker can exploit the vulnerabilities if the VxWorks device is operated as a server that accepts TCP connections, if the VxWorks device connects to a malicious host operated by the attacker, or as a man-in-the-middle, manipulating a TCP connection between the VxWorks device and a legitimate host.

CVE-2019-12258

This vulnerability affects established TCP sessions. An attacker who can figure out the source and destination TCP port and IP addresses of a session can inject invalid TCP segments into the flow, causing the TCP session to be reset.

Phoenix Contact Emalytics Controller ILC 2050 BI are developed and designed for the use in protected building automation networks.
An issue was discovered on Phoenix Contact Emalytics Controller ILC 2050 BI before 1.2.3 and BI-L before 1.2.3 devices. There is an insecure mechanism for read and write access to the configuration of the device. The mechanism can be discovered by examining a link on the website of the device.